सोमवार, 5 मई 2014

भारत पाकिस्तान के बीच द्वितीय युद्ध





प्रस्तुति-- नेहा सिन्हा रजनीश सिन्हा



Translation arrow-indic.svg यह सम्पूर्ण पृष्ठ या इसके कुछ विभाग हिन्दी के अतिरिक्त अन्य भाषा(ओं) में भी लिखे गए हैं। आप इनका अनुवाद करके विकिपीडिया की सहायता कर सकते हैं।
भारत और पाकिस्तान के बीच १९६५ का युद्ध
भारत पाक युद्ध का भाग
तिथि अगस्त – सितम्बर 23, 1965
स्थान भारतीय उपमहाद्वीप
परिणाम संयुक्त राष्ट्र के घोषनापत्र के द्वारा युद्धविराम .[1] सीमा क्षेत्रो मे कॊई बदलाव नही (देखें ताशकंद घोषणापत्र).
योद्धा
Flag of India.svg
भारत
Flag of Pakistan.svg
पाकिस्तान
सेनानायक
Flag of भारत जंयंतो नाथ चौधरी
Flag of भारत हरबख्श सिंग
Flag of भारत अर्जन सिंग
Flag of भारत गुरबख्श सिंग
Flag of पाकिस्तान अयूब खान
Flag of पाकिस्तान मूसा खान
Flag of पाकिस्तान Tikka Khan
Flag of पाकिस्तान नूर खान
Flag of पाकिस्तान नासिर अहमद खान
शक्ति/क्षमता

~१५० वायुयान
मृत्यु एवं हानि
तटस्थ आकलन[2][3]
  • ३,००० सैनिक[2]
  • न्यूनतम १७५ टैंक[2]
  • ६०-७५ वायुयान[2]
  • ७७७ कि.मी से अधिक (३०० मील) सीमाक्षेत्र पर दुश्मन का क्ब्जा
भारतीय दावा
  • ५९ वायुयान नष्ट[4]
पाकिस्तानी दावा
  • ११० वायुयान नष्ट[5]
तटस्थ आकलन [2]
  • ३,८०० सैनिक[2]
  • २०० टैंक[2]
  • २० वायुयान[2]
  • १८१३ कि.मी से अधिक (७०० मील) सीमाक्षेत्र पर दुश्मन का क्ब्जा
पाकिस्तानी दावा'
  • १९ वायुयान नष्ट
भारतीय दावा
  • ७३ वायुयान नष्ट
  • २८० टैंक नष्ट[6]
[7][8] [9]
साँचा:Campaignbox भारत पाकिस्तान के बीच द्वितीय युद्ध
भारत-पाकिस्तान के बीच १९६५ की लड़ाई उन मुटभेड़ों का नाम है जो दोनो के बीच अप्रैल १९६५ से सितम्बर १९६५ के बीच हुई थी । इसे कश्मीर के दूसरे युद्ध के नाम से भी जाना जाता है । भारत और पाकिस्तान के बीच जम्मू और कश्मीर राज्य पर अधिकार के लिये बटवारे भारत का विभाजन के समय से ही विवाद चल रहा है। १९४७ में भारत-पाकिस्तान के बीच प्रथम युद्ध भी कश्मीर के लिये ही हुआ था । इस लड़ाई की शुरूवात पाकिस्तान ने अपने सैनिको को घुसपैठियो के रूप मे भेज कर इस उम्मीद मे की थी कि कश्मीर की जनता भारत के खिलाफ विद्रोह कर देगी [10]। इस अभियान का नाम पाकिस्तान ने युद्धभियान जिब्राल्टर रखा था । पांच महिने तक चलने वाले इस युद्ध मे दोनो पक्षो के हजारो लोग मारे गये । इस युद्ध का अंत संयुक्त राष्ट्र के द्वारा युद्ध विराम की घोषणा के साथ हुआ और ताशकंद मे दोनो पक्षो मे समझौता हुआ ।

इस लड़ाई का अधिकांश हिस्सा दोनो पक्षो की थल सेना ने लड़ा । कारगिल युद्ध के पहले कश्मीर के विषय मे कभी इतना बड़ा सैनिक जमावड़ा नही हुआ था । युद्ध मे पैदल और बख्तरबंद टुकड़ीयों ने वायुसेना की मदद से अनेक अभियानो मे हिस्सा लिया | दोनो पक्षो के बीच हुए अनेक युद्धो की तरह इस युद्ध की अनेक जानकारियां दोनो पक्षो ने सार्वजनिक नही की ।

युद्ध के पूर्व तनाव का बढना


अमेरिका के द्वारा बाद मे सार्वजनिक किया गया पत्र जिसमे जम्मू और कश्मीर मे सैकड़ो पाकिस्तानी घुसपठियो के मौजूद होने की खुफिया सूचना उसे दी गयी थी
भारत और पाकिस्तान के १९४७ मे हुए बटवारे भारत का विभाजन के समय से ही भारत और पाकिस्तान के बीच कई मुद्दो पर तनातनी चल रही थी हालांकि जम्मू और कशमीर का मुद्दा इसमे सबसे बड़ा था पर अन्य सीमा विवाद भी थे इनमे सबसे प्रमुख कच्छ का रन जो कि एक बंजर इलाका है के बटवारे पर था । २० मार्च १९६५ मे पाकिस्तान के द्वारा जानबूझ [11] I कर कच्छ के रन मे झडपे शुरू कर दी गयी । शुरू मे इनमे केवल सीमा सुरक्षा बल ही शामिल थे पर बाद मे दोनो देशोम की सेना भी युद्ध मे शामिल हो गयी [12] I जून १९६५ मे ब्रिटिश प्रधानमंत्री हैरोल्ड विल्सन ने दोनो पक्षो के बीच लड़ाई रुकवा कर इस विवाद को हल करने के लिये एक निष्पक्ष मध्यस्थ न्यायालय की स्थापना कर दी । इस न्यायालय ने (जिसका निर्णय तो बाद मे १९६८ मे आया पर रुख पहले ही स्पष्ट हो चुका था ) कच्छ के रन की करीब ९०० वर्ग किलोमीटर जगह पाकिस्तान को दे दी । हालांकि पाकिस्तान का दावा ३५०० वर्ग किलोमीटर पर था .[13]

कच्छ के रन मे मिली सगफलता से उत्साहित पाकिस्तान के राजनेताओ खासकर तत्कालीन विदेशमंत्री जुल्फीकार अली भुट्टो ने राष्ट्र्पति और सेनाध्यक्ष जनरल अयूब खान पर दबाव डाला कि वे कश्मीर पर हमले का आदेश दे । भारत उस समय चीन[14] से युद्ध हार चुका और उनका मानना था कि भारत उस समय युद्ध करने की स्थिती मे नही था । इसके अलावा भुट्टो और उनके विचार से सहमत अन्य जनरलो याह्या खान और टिक्का खान का यह भी मानना था कि कश्मीर की जनता भारत से आजाद होकर पाकिस्तान से विलय की इच्छुक है और सैनिको को घुसपठियो के वेश मे भेजने पर उनके समर्थन मे विद्रोह कर देगी । आखिर जनरल अयूब खान दबाव मे आ गये और उन्होने गुप्त सैनिक अभियान जिब्राल्टर[15] का आदेश दे दिया । इस अभियान का मुख्य उद्देश्य कश्मीर की जनता मे विद्रोह भड़काना और भारतीय संचारतंत्र एवं परिवहन व्यवस्था को नुकसान पहुचाना था । पाकिस्तान के घुसपैठियो को जल्दी ही पहचान लिया गया विद्रोह करने के बजाय जनता ने उनकी सूचना भारतीय सैनिको को दे दी और यह अभियान पूर्णतः विफल हो गया ।

यु्द्ध

५ अगस्त १९६५ को २६००० से ३०००० के बीच पाकिस्तानी सैनिको ने कश्मीर की स्थानीय आबादी की वेषभूषा मे नियंत्रण रेखा को पार कर भारतीय कश्मीर मे प्रवेश कर लिया । भारतीय सेना ने स्थानीय आबादी से इसकी सूचना पाकर १५ अगस्त को नियंत्रण रेखा को पार किया [14]

सेनाध्यक्ष पाकिस्तान, जनरल मुहम्मद मूसा खान कब्जे मे लिये गये भारतीय क्षेत्र खेमकरण के रेल भवन मे भारत
शुरुवात मे भारतीय सेना को अच्छी सफलता मिली उसने तोपखाने की मदद से तीन महत्वपूर्ण पहाड़ी ठिकानो पर कब्जा जमा लिया । पाकिस्तान ने टिथवाल उरी और पुंछ क्षेत्रो मे महत्वपूर्ण बढत कर ली पर १८ अगस्त पाकिस्तानी अभियान की ताकत मे काफी कमी आ गयी थी भारतीय अतिरिक्त टुकड़िया लाने मे सफल हो गये भारत ने पाकिस्तान के क्ब्जे वाले कश्मीर मे ८ किलोमीटर अंदर घुस कर हाजी पीर दर्रे पर कब्जा कर लिया । इस कब्जे से पाकिस्तान सकते मे आ गया अभियान जिब्राल्टर के घुसपठिये सनिको का रास्ता भारतीयो के कब्जे मे आ गया था और अभियान विफल हो गया यही नही पाकिस्तान की कमान को लगने लगा कि पाकिस्तानी कश्मीर का महत्वपूर्ण शहर मुजफ्फराबाद अब भारतीयो के कब्जे मे जाने ही वाला है | मुजफ्फराबाद पर दबाव कम करने के लिये पाकिस्तान ने एक नया अभियान ग्रैंड स्लैम शुरू किया ।

१ सितम्बर १९६५ को पाकिस्तान ने ग्रैंड स्लैम नामक एक अभियान के तहत सामरिक द्रुष्टी से महत्वपूर्ण शहर अखनूर जम्मू और कश्मीरपर कब्जे के लिये आक्रमण कर दिया । इस अभियान का उद्देश्य कश्मीर घाटी का शेष भारत से संपर्क तोड था ताकि उसकी रसद और संचार वय्वस्था भंग कर दी जाय । पाकिस्तान के इस आक्रमण के लिये भारत तैयार नही था और पाकिस्तान को भारी संख्या मे सैनिको और बेहतर किस्म के टैंको का लाभ मिल रहा था । शुरूवात मे भारत को भारी क्षती उठानी पड़ी इस पर भारतीय सेना ने हवाई हमले का उपयोग किया इसके जवाब मे पाकिस्तान ने पंजाब और श्रीनगर के हवाई ठिकानो पर हमला कर दिया । युद्ध के इस चरण मे पाकिस्तान अत्यधिक बेहतर स्थिती मे था और इस अप्रत्याशित हमले से भारतीय खेमे मे घबराहट फैल गयी थी । अखनूर के पाकिस्तानी सेना के हाथ मे जाने से भारत के लिये कश्मीर घाटी मे हार का खतरा पैदा हो सकता था ।ग्रैंड स्लैम के विफल होने की दो वजहे थी सबसे पहली और बड़ी वजह यह थी कि पाकिस्तान की सैनिक कमान ने जीत के मुहाने मे पर अपने सैनिक कमांडर को बदल दिया ऐसे मे पाकिस्तानी सेना को आगे बढने मे एक दिन की देरी हो गयी और उन २४ घंटो मे भारत को अखनूर की रक्षा के लिये अतिरिक्त सैनिक और सामान लाने का मौका मिल गया खुद भारर्तीय सेना के स्थानीय कमांडर भौचक्के थे कि पाकिस्तान इतनी आसान जीत क्यों छोड़ रहा है । एक दिन की देरी के बावजूद भारत के पश्चिमी कमान के सेना प्रमुख यह जानते थे कि पाकिस्तान बहुत बेहतर स्थिती मे है और उसको रोकने के लिये उन्होने यह प्रस्ताव तत्कालीन सेनाध्यक्ष जनरल चौधरी को दिया कि पंजाब सीमा मे एक नया मोर्चा खोल कर लाहौर पर हमला कर दिया जाय । जनरल चौधरी इस बात से सहमत नही थे लेकिन तत्कालीन प्रधानमंत्री लाल बहादुर शाष्त्री ने उनकी बात अनसुनी कर इस हमले का आदेश दे दिया ।

ब्रिगेडियर हरी सिंह, जो उस समय प्रथम भारतीय बख्तरबंद डिविजन की१८वीं यूनिट) में सैनिक थे, लाहौर जिले में बरकी पुलिस थाने के बाहर
भारत ने ६ सितम्बर को अंतर्राष्ट्रीय सीमा रेखा कॉ पार कर पश्चिमी मोर्चे पर हमला कर युद्ध की आधिकारिक शुरूवात कर दी[16] । ६ सितम्बर को भारत की १५वी पैदल सैन्य इकाई ने द्वितीय विश्व युद्ध के अनुभवी मेजर जनरल प्रसाद के नेत्रत्व मे इच्छोगिल नहर के पश्चिमी किनारे मे पाकिस्तान के बड़े हमले का सामना किया । इच्छोगिल नहर भारत और पाकिस्तान की वास्तविक सीमा थी । इस हमले मे खुद मेजर जनरल प्रसाद के काफिले पर भी हमला हुआ और उन्हे अपना वाहन छोड़ कर भागना पड़ा । भारत ने प्रतिआअक्रमण मे बरकी गांव के समीप नहर को पार करने मे सफलता अर्जित कर ली । इससे भारतीय सेना लाहौर के हवाई अडडे पर हमला करने की सीमा मे पहुच गयी इसके परिणामस्वरूप अमेरिका ने अपने नागरिको को लाहौर से निकालने के लिये कुछ समय के लिये युद्धविराम की अपील की । इसी बीच पाकिस्तान ने लाहौर पर दबाव को कम करने के लिये खेमकरण पर हमला कर उस पर कब्जा कर लिया बदले मे भारत ने बेदियां और उसके आस पास के गावों पर हमला कर दिया ।
६ सितम्बर कॉ लाहौर पर हमले मे भारतीय सेना के प्रथम पैदल सैन्य खन्ड (इनफैंट्री डिविजन) के साथ द्वितीय बख्तरबंद उपखन्ड(ब्रिगेड) के तीन टैंक दस्ते शामिल थे । वे तुरंत ही सीमा पार करके इच्छोगिल नहर पहुच गये पाकिस्तानी सेना ने पुलियाओं पर रक्षा दस्ते तैनात कर दिये जिन पुलो को बचाया नही जा सकता था उनको उड़ा दिया गया पाकिस्तान के इस कदम से भारतीय सेना का आगे बढना रुक गया । जाट रेजीमेंट की एक इकाई 3 जाट ने नहर पार करके डोगराई और बातापोर पर कब्जा कर लिया[17] । उसी दिन पाकिस्तानी सेना ने बख्तरबंद इकाई और वायुसेना की मदद से भारतीय सेना की १५वे खन्ड पर बड़ा प्रतिआक्रमण किया हालाकि इससे ३ जाट को मामूली नुकसान ही हुआ लेकिन १५वे खन्ड को पीछे हटना पड़ा और उसके रसद और हथियारो के वाहनो को काफी क्षती पहुची । भारतीय सेना के बड़े अधिकारियो को जमीनी हालात की सही जानकारी नही थी अतः उन्होने इस आशंका से कि ३ जाट को भी भारी नुकसान हुआ है उसे पीछे हटने का आदेश दे दिया इससे ३ जाट के कमान आधिकारी को बड़ी निराशा हुई [18] और बाद मे उन्हे डोगराई पर फिर कब्जा करने के लिये बड़ी कीमत चुकानी पड़ी ।

खेमकरण के पास पाकिस्तानी सेना के नष्ट और भारत द्वारा कब्जे मे लिये हुये पैटन और शरमन टैंक । करीब ९७ टैंक असल उत्तर नामक अभियान मे भारतीयो के कब्जे मे आ गये थे । Battle of Asal Uttar.[19][20]
८ दिसम्बर १९६५ को ५ मराठा लाईट इनफ़ैन्ट्री का एक दस्ता रणनीतिक रूप से महत्वपूर्ण कस्बे मुनाबाव मे तैनात राजस्थान सैन्य बल कॊ मजबूती प्रदान करने के लिये भेजा गया । उनको पाकिस्तानी सेना के पैदल द्स्ते को आगे बढने से रोकने का आदेश मिला था पर वे केवल अपनी चौकी की रक्षा ही कर पाये पाकिस्तानी सेना के तोपखाने से हुई भारी बमबारी और हवाई और पैदल सैन्य आक्रमण के बीच ५ मराठा के जवानो ने बड़ी वीरता का परिचय दिया परिणाम स्वरूप आज उस चौकी कॊ मराठा हिल के नाम से जाना जाता है । ५ मराठा की मदद के लिये भेजे गये ३ गुरखा और ९५४ भारी तोपखाना का दस्ता पाकिस्तानी वायु सेना के भारी हमले के कारण पहुच नही पाया और रसद ले कर बारमेर से आ रही ट्रैन भी गर्दा रोड रेल अड्डे के पास हमले का शिकार हो गयी १० सितम्बर को मुनाबाओ पर पाकिस्तान का कब्जा हो गया ।[21]
९ सितम्बर के बाद की घटनाओं ने दोनो देशो की सेनाओ के सबसे गर्वित खन्डो का दंभ चूर चूर कर दिया । भारत के १ बख्तरबंद खन्ड जिसे भारतीय सेना की शान कहा जाता था ने सियालकोट कि दिशा मे हमला कर दिया । छाविंडा मे पाकिस्तान की अपेक्षाक्रुत कमजोर ६ बख्तरबंद खन्ड ने बुरी तरह हरा दिया भारतीय सेना को करीब करीब १०० टैंक गवाने पड़े और पीछे हटने पर मजबूर होना पड़ा । इससे उत्साहित होकर पाकिस्तान की सेना ने भारतीयो पर प्रतिआक्रमण कर दिया और भारतीय सीमा मे आगे घुस आयी । दूसरे मोर्चे पर पाकिस्तान की शान माने जाने वाले १ बख्तरबंद खन्ड ने अमृतसर पर कब्जे के इरादे से खेमकरण पर हमला कर दिया । पाकिस्तानी सेना खेमकरण से आगे ही नही बढ पायी और उसे भारत के ४ पैदल खण्ड के हाथो करारी शिकस्त मिली करीब ९७ टैंक असल उत्तर नामक भारतीय अभियान मे भारतीयो के कब्जे मे आ गये थे जबकि भारत के केवल ३० टैंक क्षतिग्रस्त हुए थे । इसके बाद यह जगह अमेरिका मे बने पैटन नाम के पाकिस्तानी टैंको के उपर पैटन नगर के नाम से जानी जाने लगी । इस लड़ाई के बाद पाकिस्तान की शान माने जाने वाले १ बख्तरबंद खन्ड ने १९६५ के युद्ध मे आगे भाग नही लिया ।
इस समय तक युद्ध मे ठहराव आ गया था और दोनो देश अपने द्वारा जीते हुए इलाको की रक्षा मे ज्यादा ध्यान दे रहे थे । लड़ाई मे भारतीय सेना के ३००० और पाकिस्तानी सेना के ३८०० जवान मारे जा चुके थे । भारत ने युद्ध मे ७१० वर्ग किलोमीटर इलाके मे और पाकिस्तान ने २१० वर्ग किलोमीटर इलाके मे कब्जा कर लिया था । भारत के क्ब्जे मे सियालकोट , लाहौर और कश्मीर के उपजाऊ इलाके थे[22]
और पाकिस्तान के कब्जे मे सिंध और छंब के अनुपजाऊ इलाके थे .[23]

हवाई युद्ध


इस युद्ध में आजादी के बाद पहली बार भारतीय वायु सेना (आईएएफ) एवं पाकिस्तान वायु सेना (पीएएफ) के विमानों ने एक दुसरे का मुकाबला किया . इससे पहले इन दोनों वायु-सेनाओं ने १९४० के दशक में प्रथम कश्मीर युद्ध में हिस्सा लिया था जिसमें कि १९६५ युद्ध की तुलना में इनका योगदान बहुत कम और केवल परिवहन तक ही सीमित था.
The IAF was flying large numbers of Hawker Hunter, Indian-manufactured Folland Gnats, de Havilland Vampires, EE Canberra bombers and a squadron of MiG-21s. The PAF's fighter force comprised 102 F-86F Sabres and 12 F-104 Starfighters, along with 24 B-57 Canberra bombers. During the conflict the PAF was out-numbered by around 5:1.[24]
The PAF's aircraft were largely of American origin, whereas the IAF flew an assortment of Soviet and European aeroplanes. It has been widely reported that the PAF's American aircraft were superior to those of the IAF, but according to some experts this is untrue because the IAF's MiG-21, Hawker Hunter and Folland Gnat fighters actually had higher performance than their PAF counter-part, the F-86 Sabre.[25] Although the IAF's de Havilland Vampire fighter-bombers were outdated in comparison to the F-86 Sabre, the Hawker Hunter fighters were superior in both power and speed to the F-86 according to Air Cdre (retired) Sajjad Haider, who lead the PAF's No.19 Squadron in combat during the war.[26]
According to the Indians, the F-86 was vulnerable to the diminutive Folland Gnat, nicknamed "Sabre Slayer."[27] The PAF's F-104 Starfighter of the PAF was the fastest fighter operating in the subcontinent at that time and was often referred to as "the pride of the PAF". However, according to Air Cdre (retired) Sajjad Haider who flew with the PAF's No.19 Squadron, the F-104 did not deserve this reputation. Being "a high level interceptor designed to neutralise Soviet strategic bombers in altitudes above 40,000 feet," rather than engage in dogfights with agile fighters at low altitudes, it was "unsuited to the tactical environment of the region."[28] It can be argued that, although the IAF is believed to have feared the Starfighter,[28] in combat it was not as effective as the IAF's far more agile, albeit much slower, Folland Gnat fighter.[29][30]
चित्र:PAF gallery.jpg
Indian Folland Gnat on display at the PAF Museum Gallery.
The two countries have made contradictory claims of combat losses during the war and few neutral sources have verified the claims of either country. The PAF claimed it shot down 104 IAF planes and lost 19 of its own, while the IAF claimed it shot down 73 PAF planes and lost 35.[31] According to one independent source, the PAF flew 86 F-86 Sabres, 10 F-104 Starfighters and 20 B-57 Canberras in a parade soon after the war was over. Thus disproving the IAF's claim of downing 73 PAF fighters, which at the time constituted nearly the entire Pakistani front-line fighter force.[32]
Indian sources have pointed out that, despite PAF claims of losing only a squadron of combat craft, Pakistan sought to acquire additional aircraft from Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Turkey and China within 10 days of the beginning war.[कृपया उद्धरण जोड़ें] But this could be explained by the 5:1 disparity in numbers faced by the PAF.[कृपया उद्धरण जोड़ें]

टैंक युद्ध


Tanks of 18th Cavalry (Indian Army) on the move during the 1965 Indo-Pak War.
The 1965 war witnessed some of the largest tank battles since World War II. At the beginning of the war, the Pakistani Army had both a numerical advantage in tanks, as well as better equipment overall.[33] Pakistani armour was largely American-made; it consisted mainly of Patton M-47 and M-48 tanks, but also included many M4 Sherman tanks, some M24 Chaffee light tanks and M36 Jackson tank destroyers, equipped with 90 mm guns.[34] The bulk of India's tank fleet were older M4 Sherman tanks; some were up-gunned with the French high velocity CN 75 50 guns and could hold their own, whilst some older models were still equipped with the inferior 75 mm M3 L/40 gun. Besides the M4 tanks, India fielded the British-made Centurion Tank Mk 7, with the 105 mm Royal Ordnance L7 gun, and the AMX-13, PT-76, and M3 Stuart light tanks. Pakistan fielded a greater number and more modern artillery; its guns out-ranged those of the Indian artillery, according to Pakistan's Major General T.H. Malik.[35]
At the outbreak of war in 1965, Pakistan had about 15 armoured cavalry regiments, each with about 45 tanks in three squadrons. Besides the Pattons, there were about 200 M4 Shermans re-armed with 76 mm guns, 150 M24 Chaffee light tank and a few independent squadrons of M36B1 tank destroyers. Most of these regiments served in Pakistan's two armoured divisions, the 1st and 6th Armoured divisions – the latter being in the process of formation.
The Indian Army of the time possessed 17 cavalry regiments, and in the 1950s had begun modernizing them by the acquisition of 164 AMX-13 light tanks and 188 Centurions. The remainder of the cavalry units were equipped with M4 Shermans and a small number of M3A3 Stuart light tanks. India had only a single armoured division, the 1st 'Black Elephant' Armoured Division, also called 'Fakhr-i-Hind' ('Pride of India'), which consisted of the 17th Cavalry (The Poona Horse), the 4th Hodson's Horse, the 16th 'Black Elephant' Cavalry, the 7th Light Cavalry, the 2nd Lancers, the 18th Cavalry and the 62nd Cavalry, the two first named being equipped with Centurions. There was also the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade, one of whose three regiments, the 3rd Cavalry, was also equipped with Centurions.
Despite the qualitative and numerical superiority of Pakistani armour,[36] Pakistan was outfought on the battlefield by India, which made progress into the Lahore-Sialkot sector, whilst halting Pakistan's counteroffensive on Amritsar.;[37][38] they were sometimes employed in a faulty manner, such as charging prepared defenses during the defeat of Pakistan's 1st Armoured Division at Assal Uttar.
चित्र:ChawindaBattel.jpg
Pakistani soldiers during the Battle of Chawinda. Brigadier A.A.K. Niazi, (3rd from left) observing a map
Although India's tank formations experienced same results, India's attack at the Battle of Chawinda, led by its 1st Armored Division and supporting units, was brought to a grinding halt by the newly raised 6th Armoured Division (ex-100th independent brigade group) in the Chawinda sector. The Indians lost 120 tanks at Chawinda.[39] One true winner to emerge was India's Centurion battle tank, with its 105 mm gun and heavy armour, which proved superior to the overly complex Pattons and their exaggerated reputations.[38]However, in the Sialkot sector outnumbered Pattons performed exceedingly well in the hands of the 25th Cavalry and other regiments of the 6th Armoured Division, which exacted a disproportionately heavy toll of Centurions from the Poona Horse and Hodson's Horse. The Indian Army has made much of the fact that some of its Centurions survived repeated hits; yet have failed to point out that the majority of tanks in the Sialkot sector were Shermans whose guns were inadequate even in 1944. Neither the Indian nor Pakistani Army showed any great facility in the use of armoured formations in offensive operations, whether the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division at Asal Uttar or the Indian 1st Armoured Division at Chawinda. In contrast, both proved adept with smaller forces in a defensive role such a the 2nd Armoured Brigade at Asal Uttar and the 25th Cavalry at Chawinda, where they defeated their better equipped but clumsier foes

नौसैनिक युद्ध

The navies of India and Pakistan did not play a prominent role in the war of 1965, although Pakistani accounts dispute this.[40] On September 7, a flotilla of the Pakistani Navy carried out a small scale bombardment of the Indian coastal town and radar station of Dwarka, which was 200 miles (300 km) south of the Pakistani port of Karachi. Codenamed Operation Dwarka, it did not fulfill its primary objective of disabling the radar station and there was no immediate retaliatory response from India. Later, some of the Indian fleet sailed from Bombay to Dwarka to patrol the area and deter further bombardment. Foreign authors have noted that the "insignificant bombardment"[41] of the town was a "limited engagement, with no strategic value."[40]
According to some Pakistani sources, one submarine, PNS Ghazi, kept the Indian Navy's aircraft carrier INS Vikrant besieged in Bombay throughout the war. Indian sources claim that it was not their intention to get into a naval conflict with Pakistan, and wished to restrict the war to a land-based conflict.[42] Moreover, they note that the Vikrant was in dry dock in the process of refitting. Some Pakistani defence writers have also discounted claims that the Indian Navy was bottled up in Bombay by a single submarine, instead stating that 75% of the Indian Navy was under maintenance in harbour.[43]

Covert operations

The Pakistan Army launched a number of covert operations to infiltrate and sabotage Indian airbases.[44] On September 7, 1965, the Special Services Group (SSG) commandos were parachuted into enemy territory. According to Chief of Army Staff General Musa Khan, about 135 commandos were airdropped at three Indian airfields(Halwara, Pathankot and Adampur). The daring attempt proved to be an "unmitigated disaster".[44] Only 22 commandos returned to Pakistan as planned, 93 were taken prisoner (including one of the Commanders of the operations, Major Khalid Butt), and 20 were killed in encounters with the army, police or civilians[45] The reason for the failure of the commando mission is attributed to the failure to provide maps, proper briefings and adequate planning or preparation[46]
Despite failing to sabotage the airfields, Pakistan sources claim that the commando mission affected some planned Indian operations. As the Indian 14th Infantry Division was diverted to hunt for paratroopers, the Pakistan Air Force found the road filled with transport, and destroyed many vehicles.[47]
India responded to the covert activity by announcing rewards for captured Pakistani spies or paratroopers.[48] Meanwhile, in Pakistan, rumors spread that India had retaliated with its own covert operations, sending commandos deep into Pakistan territory,[46] but these rumors were later determined to be unfounded.[49]

Assessment of losses

India and Pakistan make widely divergent claims about the damage they inflicted on each other and the amount of damage suffered by them. The following summarizes each nation's claims.

Indian claims[50] Pakistani claims[51] Independent Sources[14][52]
Casualties  –  – 3,000 Indian soldiers, 3,800 Pakistani soldiers
Combat flying effort 4,073+ combat sorties 2,279 combat sorties
Aircraft lost 35 IAF (official), 73 PAF.Other sources[53] based on the Official Indian Armed Forces History[54] put actual IAF losses at 30 including 19 accidents (non combat sortie rate is not known) and PAF's combat losses alone at 43. 19 PAF, 104 IAF 20 PAF, Pakistan claims India rejected neutral arbitration.[55][56]
Aerial victories 17 + 3 (post war) 30  –
Tanks destroyed 128 Indian tanks, 152 Pakistani tanks captured, 150 Pakistani tanks destroyed. Officially 471 Pakistani tanks destroyed and 38 captured[कृपया उद्धरण जोड़ें] 165 Pakistan tanks[57]
Land area won 1,500 mi2 (3,885 km2) of Pakistani territory 250 mi² (648 km²) of Indian territory India held 710 वर्ग मील mi²(1,840 किमी²) of Pakistani territory and Pakistan held 210 वर्ग मील(545 वर्ग किमी) of Indian territory

Neutral assessments

There have been several neutral assessments of the losses incurred by both India and Pakistan during the war. Most of these assessments agree that India had a upper hand over Pakistan when ceasefire was declared. Some of the neutral assessments are mentioned below —
The war was militarily inconclusive; each side held prisoners and some territory belonging to the other. Losses were relatively heavy—on the Pakistani side, twenty aircraft, 200 tanks, and 3,800 troops. Pakistan's army had been able to withstand Indian pressure, but a continuation of the fighting would only have led to further losses and ultimate defeat for Pakistan. Most Pakistanis, schooled in the belief of their own martial prowess, refused to accept the possibility of their country's military defeat by "Hindu India" and were, instead, quick to blame their failure to attain their military aims on what they considered to be the ineptitude of Ayub Khan and his government.
  • TIME magazine reported that India held 690 mi2 of Pakistan territory while Pakistan held 250 mi2 of Indian territory in Kashmir and Rajasthan. Additionally, Pakistan had lost almost half its armour temporarily.[59] The article further elaborates —
Severely mauled by the larger Indian armed forces, Pakistan could continue the fight only by teaming up with Red China and turning its back on the U.N.
  • Devin T. Hagerty wrote in his book "South Asia in world politics"[60] –
The invading Indian forces outfought their Pakistani counterparts and halted their attack on the outskirts of Lahore, Pakistan's second-largest city. By the time United Nations intervened on September 22, Pakistan had suffered a clear defeat.
  • In his book "National identity and geopolitical visions",[61] Gertjan Dijkink writes –
The superior Indian forces, however, won a decisive victory and the army could have even marched on into Pakistani territory had external pressure not forced both combatants to cease their war efforts.
In three weeks the second Indo-Pak War ended in what appeared to be a draw when the embargo placed by Washington on U.S. ammunition and replacements for both armies forced cessation of conflict before either side won a clear victory. India, however, was in a position to inflict grave damage to, if not capture, Pakistan's capital of the Punjab when the cease-fire was called, and controlled Kashmir's strategic Uri-Poonch bulge, much to Ayub's chagrin.
  • In his book titled The greater game: India's race with destiny and China, David Van Praagh wrote[63] –
India won the war. It gained 1,840 square kilometers of Pakistani territory: 640 square kilometers in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan's portion of the state; 460 square kilometers of the Sailkot sector; 380 square kilometers far to the south of Sindh; and most critical, 360 square kilometers on the Lahore front. Pakistan took 540 square kilometers of Indian territory: 490 square kilometers in the Chhamb sector and 50 square kilometers around Khem Karan.
  • Dennis Kux's "India and the United States estranged democracies" also provides a summary of the war[64]
Although both sides lost heavily in men and material, and neither gained a decisive military advantage, India had the better of the war. New Delhi achieved its basic goal of thwarting Pakistan's attempt to seize Kashmir by force. Pakistan gained nothing from a conflict which it had instigated.
  • "A region in turmoil: South Asian conflicts since 1947" by Robert Johnson mentions[65] –
India's strategic aims were modest – it aimed to deny Pakistani Army victory, although it ended up in possession of 720 वर्ग मील (1,900 किमी2) of Pakistani territory for the loss of just 220 वर्ग मील (570 किमी2) of its own.
  • An excerpt from William M. Carpenter and David G. Wiencek's "Asian security handbook: terrorism and the new security environment"[66] –
A brief but furious 1965 war with India began with a covert Pakistani thrust across the Kashmiri cease-fire line and ended up with the city of Lahore threatened with encirclement by Indian Army. Another UN-sponsored cease-fire left borders unchanged, but Pakistan's vulnerability had again been exposed.
  • English historian John Keay's "India: A History" provides a summary of the 1965 war[67] –
The 1965 Indo-Pak war lasted barely a month. Pakistan made gains in the Rajasthan desert but its main push against India's Jammu-Srinagar road link was repulsed and Indian tanks advanced to within a sight of Lahore. Both sides claimed victory but India had most to celebrate.
  • Uk Heo and Shale Asher Horowitz write in their book "Conflict in Asia: Korea, China-Taiwan, and India-Pakistan"[68] –
Again India appeared, logistically at least, to be in a superior position but neither side was able to mobilize enough strength to gain a decisive victory.
  • Newsweek magazine, however, praised the Pakistani military's ability to hold of the much larger Indian Army.[69]
By just the end of the week, in fact, it was clear that the Pakistanis were more than holding their own.

युध्विराम्

The United States and the Soviet Union used significant diplomatic tools to prevent any further escalation in the conflict between the two South Asian nations. The Soviet Union, led by Premier Alexei Kosygin, hosted ceasefire negotiations in Tashkent (now in Uzbekistan), where Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President Ayub Khan signed the Tashkent Agreement, agreeing to withdraw to pre-August lines no later than February 25, 1966.
With declining stockpiles of ammunition, Pakistani leaders feared the war tilting in India's favor. Therefore, they quickly accepted the ceasefire in Tashkent.[70] Despite strong opposition from Indian military leaders, India budged to growing international diplomatic pressure and accepted the ceasefire.[70] On September 22, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed a resolution that called for an unconditional ceasefire from both nations. The war ended the following day.
India's Prime Minister, Shastri, suffered a fatal heart attack soon after the declaration of the ceasefire. As a consequence, the public outcry in India against the ceasefire declaration transformed into a wave of sympathy for the ruling Indian National Congress.[71] The ceasefire was criticized by many Pakistanis who, relying on fabricated official reports and the controlled Pakistani press, believed that the leadership had surrendered military gains. The protests led to student riots.[72] Pakistan State's reports had suggested that their military was performing admirably in the war – which they incorrectly blamed as being initiated by India – and thus the Tashkent Declaration was seen as having forfeited the gains.[73] Some recent books written by Pakistani authors, including one by ex-ISI chief titled "The Myth of 1965 Victory",[74] allegedly exposed Pakistani fabrications about the war, but all copies of the book were bought by Pakistan Army to prevent publication because the topic was "too sensitive".[75][76]
India and Pakistan accused each other of ceasefire violations; India charged Pakistan with 585 violations in 34 days, while Pakistan countered with accusations of 450 incidents by India.[77] In addition to the expected exchange of small arms and artillery fire, India reported that Pakistan utilized the ceasefire to capture the Indian village of Chananwalla in the Fazilka sector. This village was recaptured by Indian troops on 25 December. On October 10, a B-57 Canberra on loan to the PAF was damaged by 3 SA-2 missiles fired from the IAF base at Ambala.[78] A Pakistani Army Auster was shot down on 16 December, killing one Pakistani army captain and on 2 February 1967, an AOP was shot down by IAF Hunters.
The ceasefire remained in effect until the start of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971.

Intelligence failures

Strategic miscalculations by both India and Pakistan ensured that the war ended in a stalemate —

Indian miscalculations

Indian military intelligence gave no warning of the impending Pakistan invasion. The Indian Army failed to recognize the presence of heavy Pakistani artillery and armaments in Chumb and suffered significant losses as a result.
The "Official History of the 1965 War", drafted by the Ministry of Defence of India in 1992, was a long suppressed document that revealed other miscalculations. According to the document, on September 22 when the Security Council was pressing for a ceasefire, the Indian Prime Minister asked commanding Gen. Chaudhuri if India could possibly win the war, were he to delay accepting the ceasefire. The general replied that most of India's frontline ammunition had been used up and the Indian Army had suffered considerable tank losses. It was determined later that only 14% of India's frontline ammunition had been fired and India held twice the number of tanks as Pakistan. By this time, the Pakistani Army had used close to 80% of its ammunition.
Air Chief Marshal (retd) P.C. Lal, who was the Vice Chief of Air Staff during the conflict, points to the lack of coordination between the IAF and the Indian army. Neither side revealed its battle plans to the other. The battle plans drafted by the Ministry of Defence and General Chaudhari, did not specify a role for the Indian Air Force in the order of battle. This attitude of Gen. Chaudhari was referred to by ACM Lal as the "Supremo Syndrome", a patronizing attitude sometimes held by the Indian army towards the other branches of the Indian Military.[50]

Pakistani miscalculations

The Pakistani Army's failures started with the supposition that a generally discontented Kashmiri people, given the opportunity provided by the Pakistani advance, would revolt against their Indian rulers, bringing about a swift and decisive surrender of Kashmir. The Kashmiri people, however, did not revolt. Instead, the Indian Army was provided with enough information to learn of Operation Gibraltar and the fact that the Army was battling not insurgents, as they had initially supposed, but Pakistani Army regulars.
चित्र:Mcconaughy20oct1965a.jpg
Telegram from the Embassy of the United States in Karachi: "Continuing propaganda regarding achievements of Pak forces seems to have convinced most that only Pak forbearance saved the Indians from disaster."
The Pakistani Army also failed to recognize that the Indian policy makers would order an attack on the southern sector in order to open a second theater of conflict. Pakistan was forced to dedicate troops to the southern sector to protect Sialkot and Lahore instead using them to support penetrating into Kashmir.
"Operation Grand Slam", which was launched by Pakistan to capture Akhnoor, a town north-east of Jammu and a key region for communications between Kashmir and the rest of India, was also a failure. Many Pakistani commentators criticized the Ayub Khan administration for being indecisive during Operation Grand Slam. These critics claim that the operation failed because Ayub Khan knew the importance of Akhnur to India (having called it India's "jugular vein") and did not want to capture it and drive the two nations into an all-out war. Despite progress being made in Akhnur, General Ayub Khan relieved the commanding Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik and replaced him with Gen. Yahya Khan. A 24-hour lull ensued the replacement, which allowed the Indian army to regroup in Akhnur and successfully oppose a lackluster attack headed by General Yahya Khan. "The enemy came to our rescue", asserted the Indian Chief of Staff of the Western Command. Later, Akhtar Hussain Malik criticized Ayub Khan for planning Operation Gibraltar, which was doomed to fail, and for relieving him of his command at a crucial moment in the war. Malik threatened to expose the truth about the war and the army's failure, but later dropped the idea for fear of being banned.[79]
Some authors have noted that Pakistan might have been emboldened by a war game – conducted in March 1965, at the Institute of Defence Analysis, USA. The exercise concluded that, in the event of a war with India, Pakistan would win.[80][81] Other authors like Stephen Philip Cohen, have consistently commented that the Pakistan Army had "acquired an exaggerated view of the weakness of both India and the Indian military... the 1965 war was a shock".[82]
Pakistani Air Marshal and Commander-in-Chief of PAF during the war, Nur Khan, later said thgnf fhfhfffhn Army, and not India, should be blamed for starting the war.[83][84] However propaganda in Pakistan about the war continued; the war was not rationally analyzed in Pakistan,[85][86] with most of the blame being heaped on the leadership and little importance given to intelligence failures that persisted until the debacle of the 1971 war, when then East Pakistan was invaded by India and seceded from West Pakistan, leading to the creation of Bangladesh. hghginj ujjjjfhffuhhh

Involvement of other nations

Pakistan and the United States had signed an Agreement of Cooperation in 1959 under which the United States agreed to take "appropriate action, including the use of armed forces" in order to assist the Government of Pakistan at its request.[87] However, following the start of the 1965 war, the United States was of the view that the conflict was largely Pakistan's fault and therefore, it cut all military supplies to the country.[58] However, Pakistan did receive significant support from Iran, Indonesia and People's Republic of China.[58]
Both before and during the war, the People's Republic of China had been a major military associate of Pakistan and had invariably admonished India, with whom it had fought a war in 1962. There were also reports of Chinese troop movements on the Indian border to support Pakistan.[88] As such, India agreed to the UN mandate in order to avoid a war on both borders.
India's participation in the Non-Aligned Movement yielded little support from its members. Despite close relations between with India, the Soviet Union was more neutral than most other nations during the war and even invited both nations to talks that it would host in Tashkent.[89][90]

Aftermath

India

Despite the declaration of a ceasefire, India was perceived as the victor due to its success in halting the Pakistan-backed insurgency in Kashmir.[91] In its October 1965 issue, the TIME magazine quoted a Western official assessing the consequences of the war[92] —
Now it's apparent to everybody that India is going to emerge as an Asian power in its own right.
In light of the failures of the Sino-Indian War, the outcome of the 1965 war was viewed as a "politico-strategic" victory in India. The Indian premier, Lal Bahadur Shastri, was hailed as a national hero in India.[93]
While the overall performance of the Indian military was praised, military leaders were criticized for their failure to effectively deploy India's superior armed forces so as to achieve a decisive victory over Pakistan.[94] In his book "War in the modern world since 1815", noted war historian Jeremy Black said that though Pakistan "lost heavily" during the 1965 war, India's hasty decision to call for negotiations prevented further considerable damage to the Pakistan Armed Forces. He elaborates[95] —
India's chief of army staff urged negotiations on the ground that they were running out ammunition and their number of tanks had become seriously depleted. In fact, the army had used less than 15% of its ammunition compared to Pakistan, which had consumed closer to 80 percent and India had double the number of serviceable tanks.
As a consequence, India focussed on enhancing communication and coordination within and among the triservices of the Indian Armed Forces. Partly as a result of the inefficient information gathering preceding the war, India established the Research and Analysis Wing for external espionage and intelligence. Major improvements were also made in command and control to address various shortcomings and the positive impact of these changes was clearly visible during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 when India achieved a decisive victory over Pakistan within two weeks.
China's repeated threats to intervene in the conflict in support of Pakistan increased pressure on the government to take an immediate decision to develop nuclear weapons.[96] Despite repeated assurances, the United States did little to prevent extensive use of American arms by Pakistani forces during the conflict which irked India.[97] At the same time, the United States and United Kingdom refused to supply India with sophisticated weaponry which further strained the relations between the West and India.[98] These developments led to a significant change in India's foreign policy — India, which had previously championed the cause of non-alignment, distanced itself further from Western powers and developed close relations with the Soviet Union. By the end of 1960s, the Soviet Union emerged as the biggest supplier of military hardware to India.[99] From 1967 to 1977, 81% of India's arms imports were from the Soviet Union.[100] After the 1965 war, the arms race between India and Pakistan became even more asymmetric and India was outdistancing Pakistan by far.[101]

Pakistan

At the conclusion of the war, many Pakistanis considered the performance of their military to be positive. September 6 is celebrated as 'Defence Day' in Pakistan, in commemoration of the successful defence of Lahore against the Indian army. The performance of the Pakistani Air Force, in particular, was praised.
However, the Pakistani government was accused by foreign analysts of spreading disinformation among its citizens regarding the actual consequences of the war.[102] In his book "Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani foreign policies", S.M. Burke writes[60] —
After the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 the balance of military power had decisively shifted in favor of India. Pakistan had found it difficult to replace the heavy equipment lost during that conflict while her adversary, despite her economic and political problems, had been determinedly building up her strength.
Most observers agree that the myth of a mobile, hard hitting Pakistan Army was badly dented in the war, as critical breakthroughs were not made.[103] Several Pakistani writers criticized the military's ill-founded belief that their "martial race" of soldiers could defeat "Hindu India" in the war.[104][105] Rasul Bux Rais, a Pakistani political analyst wrote[106] –
The 1965 war with India proved that Pakistan could neither break the formidable Indian defenses in a blitzkrieg fashion nor could she sustain an all-out conflict for long.
Moreover, Pakistan had lost more ground than it had gained during the war and, more importantly, failed to achieve its goal of occupying Kashmir; this result has been viewed by many impartial observers as a defeat for Pakistan.[107][108][109]
Many high ranking Pakistani officials and military experts later criticized the faulty planning of Operation Gibraltar that ultimately led to the war. The Tashkent declaration was also criticized in Pakistan, though few citizens realised the gravity of the situation that existed at the end of the war. Political leaders were also criticized. Following the advice of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan's foreign minister, Ayub Khan had raised very high expectations among the people of Pakistan about the superiority – if not invincibility – of its armed forces,[110] but Pakistan's inability to attain its military aims during the war, created a political liability for Ayub.[111] The defeat of its Kashmiri ambitions in the war led to the army's invincibility being challenged by an increasingly vocal opposition.[112]
One of the most far reaching consequences of the war was the wide-scale economic slowdown in Pakistan.[113][114] The cost of the 1965 war put an end to the impressive period economic growth Pakistan had experienced during early 1960s. Between 1964 and 1966, Pakistan's defence spending rose from 4.82% to 9.86% of GDP, putting tremendous strain on Pakistan's economy. By 1970–71, defence spending comprised a whopping 55.66% of government expenditure.[115]
Pakistan was surprised by the lack of support by the United States, an ally with whom the country had signed an Agreement of Cooperation. USA declared its neutrality in the war by cutting off military supplies to both sides,[14] leading Islamabad to believe that they were "betrayed" by the United States.[116] After the war, Pakistan would increasingly look towards China as a major source of military hardware and political support.
Another negative consequence of the war was the growing resentment against the Pakistani government in East Pakistan (present day Bangladesh),[82] particularly for West Pakistan's obsession with Kashmir.[117] Bengali leaders accused the central government of not providing adequate security for East Pakistan during the conflict, even though large sums of money were taken from the east to finance the war for Kashmir.[118] In fact, despite some Pakistan Air Force attacks being launched from bases in East Pakistan during the war, India did not retaliate in that sector,[119] although East Pakistan was defended only by an understrenghted infantry division (14 Division), sixteen planes and no tanks.[120] Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was critical of the disparity in military resources deployed in East and West Pakistan, calling for greater autonomy for East Pakistan, which ultimately led to the Bangladesh Liberation war and another war between India and Pakistan in 1971.

इन्हें भी देखें

References

  1. Indo-Pakistani War of 1965
  2. Thomas M. Leonard, "Encyclopedia of the developing world, Volume 2", page 806, Google Books URL: http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=pWRjGZ9H7hYC&pg=PA806&lpg=PA806&dq=pakistani+casualties+in+battle+of+lahore+1965&source=bl&ots=C8A8bQcxSk&sig=LDNtNeO2EMkuVzRlF7QQAxvZW2g&hl=en&ei=ldseSs-aHdyZjAeX7JWLDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5#v=onepage&q=&f=false
  3. "Indo-Pakistan Wars". Archived from the original on 2009-11-01.
  4. http://www.tribuneindia.com/2007/20070506/spectrum/main1.htm
  5. http://pakistaniat.com/2007/09/06/1965-war-a-different-legacy/comment-page-6/
  6. Indo-Pakistan Wars The Tribune June 2, 2005. Archived 2009-11-01.
  7. Opinion: The Way it was 4: extracts from Brig (Retd) ZA Khan's book May 1998, Defence Journal
  8. Ayub misled nation in ’65 war: Nur Khan 8 September 2005 Khaleej Times
  9. Library of Congress Country Studies
  10. http://www.tribuneindia.com/2005/20050603/main2.htm
  11. Maj Gen (retd) Mahmud Ali Durrani, Times of India, September 2009
  12. Maj Gen (retd) Mahmud Ali Durrani, Times of India, September 2009
  13. Bhushan, Chodarat. "Tulbul, Sir Creek and Siachen: Competitive Methodologies". South Asian Journal।. March 2005, Encyclopedia Britannica and Open Forum – UNIDIR
  14. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/indo-pak_1965.htm "Indo-Pakistan War of 1965"]. Globalsecurity.com.
  15. Defence Journal. September 2000
  16. "The Lahore Offensive". Storyofpakistan.com. 1 June 2003
  17. Brigadier Desmond E Hayde, "The Battle of Dograi and Batapore", Natraj Publishers, New Delhi, 2006
  18. The Tribune, Chandigarh, India – Opinions
  19. Wilson, Peter. Wars, proxy-wars and terrorism: post independent India. Mittal Publications, 2003. आई॰ऍस॰बी॰ऍन॰ 8170998905, 9788170998907.
  20. Jaques, Tony. Dictionary of Battles and Sieges. Greenwood Publishing Group, 2007. आई॰ऍस॰बी॰ऍन॰ 0313335389, 9780313335389.
  21. [1]
  22. The Story of My Struggle By Tajammal Hussain Malik 1991, Jang Publishers, pp 78
  23. Khaki Shadows by General K.M. Arif, Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19-579396-X, 2001
  24. John Fricker, "Pakistan's Air Power", Flight International issue published 1969, page 89. URL: http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1969/1969%20-%200111.html?search=Pakistan%20Mirage%205, retrieved: 03 November 2009
  25. "Pakistan's Air Power", Flight International, issue published 5 May 1984 (page 1208). Can be viewed at FlightGlobal.com archives, URL: http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1984/1984%20-%200797.html?search=F-86%20Pakistan Retrieved: 22 October 2009
  26. http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/editorial/the-right-stuff-499
  27. See the main article Sabre Slayer for the complete list on this issue including sources.
  28. Ahmad Faruqui, "The right stuff", published by Dawn News on Monday 14 September 2009, URL: http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/editorial/the-right-stuff-499 Retrieved: 01 November 2009. Also published under title "The Debt Owed" on 16 September 2009 by [outlookindia.com], URL: http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?261856
  29. http://books.google.com/books?id=MG5wioBJyK0C&pg=PA164&dq=india+1965+pakistan+Sabre+slayer&lr=&as_brr=3&client=firefox-a
  30. http://books.google.com/books?id=p40nOZgeh84C&pg=PA161&dq=1965+pakistan+air+force+Sabre&lr=&as_brr=3&client=firefox-a#PPA162,M1
  31. Book Review
  32. John Fricker, "Pakistan's Air Power", Flight International issue published 1969, pages 89 and 90. Can be viewed at Flight International archives: page 89 URL: http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1969/1969%20-%200111.html?search=Pakistan%20Mirage%205, page 90 URL: http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1969/1969%20-%200112.html. Retrieved: 03 November 2009
  33. A history of the Pakistan Army – Defence Journal, Pakistan
  34. 90mm M36 GUN MOTOR CARRIAGE “Jackson” Post W.W.II, the M36 was employed by the US Army in Korea and was distributed to friendly nations including France, where it was used in Indo-China (Vietnam), Pakistan..
  35. The Battle for Ravi-Sutlej Corridor 1965 A Strategic and Operational Analysis Major A.H. Amin, December 30, 2001 Orbat
  36. The Widening Gulf: Asian Nationalism and American Policy By Selig Seidenman Harrison Published 1978 Free Press, pp 269
  37. The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia By Devin T. Hagerty Page 70 Published by MIT Press
  38. India and Japan: The Emerging Balance of Power in Asia By Columbia University East Asian Institute, Stanley J. Heginbotham, William Howard Wriggins. By Columbia University East Asian Institute, Published 1971, pp 254
  39. The M47 and M48 Patton tanks By Steve Zaloga, Jim Laurier ISBN 1-85532-825-9, 9781855328259 pg.35.
  40. South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan, and China By Lowell Dittmer, pp 77
  41. India's Quest for Security: defence policies, 1947–1965 By Lorne John Kavic, , 1967, University of California Press, pp 190
  42. THE INDIAN END OF THE TELESCOPE India and Its Navy by Vice Admiral Gulab Hiranandani, Indian Navy (Retired), Naval War College Review, Spring 2002, Vol. LV, No. 2
  43. Iqbal F Quadir – Pakistan's Defence Journal
  44. Defence Journal: SSG in the 1965 War
  45. Pak Def – SSG Regiment
  46. The Fighter Gap by Shoab Alam Khan in Defence Journal
  47. Defence Journal: The Way it was Extracts from Pakistan Army Brigadier (Retd) ZA Khan's book
  48. Ending the Suspense September 17, 1965, TIME magazine
  49. Remembering Our Warriors Brig (Retd) Shamim Yasin Manto S.I.(M), S.Bt, Q&A session: ("How would you assess the failures and successes of the SSG in the 1965 War?") February 2002, Defence Journal
  50. Ceasefire & After
  51. Grand Slam – A Battle of Lost Opportunities
  52. onwar
  53. Bharat-Rakshak.com http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/Misc/Loss1965.html
  54. Official History of IAF in 65 War http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1965War/PDF/1965Chapter09.pdf
  55. John Fricker an Englishman writing a book about the war http://www.chowk.com/show_article.cgi?aid=00001093&channel=civic%20center
  56. Singh, Pushpindar (1991). Fiza ya, Psyche of the Pakistan Air Force. Himalayan Books. ISBN 81-7002-038-7.
  57. M47 & M48 Patton in Pakistani Service – PakDef.Info
  58. "Pakistan :: The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965". Library of Congress Country Studies, United States of America. April 1994. अभिगमन तिथि: 2 October 2010.
  59. Silent Guns, Wary Combatants, October 1, 1965, TIME Magazine
  60. Hagerty, Devin. South Asia in world politics. Rowman & Littlefield, 2005. आई॰ऍस॰बी॰ऍन॰ 0742525872, 9780742525870.
  61. Dijkink, Gertjan. National identity and geopolitical visions: maps of pride and pain. Routledge, 1996. आई॰ऍस॰बी॰ऍन॰ 0415139341, 9780415139342.
  62. [2] India by Stanley Wolpert. Published: University of California Press, 1990
  63. Praagh, David. The greater game: India's race with destiny and China. McGill-Queen's Press – MQUP, 2003. आई॰ऍस॰बी॰ऍन॰ 0773526390, 9780773526396.
  64. "India and the United States estranged democracies", 1941–1991, ISBN 1-4289-8189-6, DIANE Publishing, Pg 238
  65. Johnson, Robert. A region in turmoil: South Asian conflicts since 1947. Reaktion Books, 2005. आई॰ऍस॰बी॰ऍन॰ 1861892578, 9781861892577.
  66. William M. Carpenter, David G. Wiencek. Asian security handbook: terrorism and the new security environment. M.E. Sharpe, 2005. आई॰ऍस॰बी॰ऍन॰ 0765615533, 9780765615534.
  67. John Keay. India: A History. Grove Press, 2001. आई॰ऍस॰बी॰ऍन॰ 027597779X, 9780275977795.
  68. Uk Heo, Shale Asher Horowitz. Conflict in Asia: Korea, China-Taiwan, and India-Pakistan. Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003. आई॰ऍस॰बी॰ऍन॰ 0802137970, 9780802137975.
  69. [Newsweek, September 20, 1965]
  70. Fortna, Virginia. Peace time: cease-fire agreements and the durability of peace. Princeton University Press, 2004. आई॰ऍस॰बी॰ऍन॰ 0691115125, 9780691115122.
  71. Dilger, Robert. American transportation policy. Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003. आई॰ऍस॰बी॰ऍन॰ 0275978532, 9780275978532.
  72. Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War By Victoria Schofield Published 2003, by I.B.Tauris ISBN 1-86064-898-3 pp112
  73. CONTROVERSY: Why Gohar Ayub is wrong about 1965 — Khalid Hasan quoting Pakistan author Husain Haqqani: "The Pakistani people were told by the state that they had been victims of aggression and that the aggression had been repelled with the help of God."..."official propaganda convinced the people of Pakistan that their military had won the war." Daily Times, June 10, 2005
  74. Can the ISI change its spots? By Akhtar Payami, Dawn (newspaper) October 7, 2006
  75. Army attempts to prevent book sales by Amir Mir Gulf News October 1, 2006 Musharraf buys all copies of sensitive ‘65 war Daily News & Analysis
  76. Inside Story of Musharraf-Mahmood Tussle by Hassan Abbas – (Belfer Center for International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government)
  77. A Cease-Fire of Sorts November 5, 1965 – TIME
  78. "The India-Pakistan Air War of 1965", Jagan Mohan and Samir Chopra, Manohar Publications, New Delhi, 2005
  79. Musharraf, the ‘poor man’s Ataturk’ By Khalid Hasan September 19, 2004 Daily Times
  80. The Crisis Game: Simulating International Conflict by Sidney F. Giffin
  81. 1965 decided fate of the subcontinent Kashmir By Susmit Kumar, Ph.D.
  82. Stephen Philip Cohen (2004). The Idea of Pakistan. Brookings Institution Press. आई॰ऍस॰बी॰ऍन॰ 0-8157-1502-1. Pages 103, 73–74
  83. Noor Khan for early end to army rule – Pakistan Daily The Nation
  84. A word from Pak: 1965 was 'wrong' The Times of India September 6, 2005]
  85. Editorial: The army and the people Daily Times June 1, 2007
  86. The Pakistan Army From 1965 to 1971 Analysis and reappraisal after the 1965 War by Maj (Retd) Agha Humayun Amin
  87. "United States - Pakistan Alliance". Library of Congress Country Studies, United States of America. April 1994. अभिगमन तिथि: 29 October 2010.
  88. Pakistan and India Play With Nuclear Fire By Jonathan Power The Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research
  89. Story of Pakistan
  90. Asymmetric Conflicts By T. V. Paul Cambridge University Press 1994 ISBN 0-521-46621-0, pp119
  91. Conley, Jerome. Indo-Russian military and nuclear cooperation: lessons and options for U.S. policy in South Asia. Lexington Books, 2001. आई॰ऍस॰बी॰ऍन॰ 0739102176, 9780739102176.
  92. Silent Guns, Wary Combatants, TIME magazine, Oct. 01, 1965
  93. The 1965 war with Pakistan – Encyclopædia Britannica
  94. Sunday Times, London. September 19, 1965
  95. Black, Jeremy. War in the modern world since 1815. Rowman & Littlefield, 2005. आई॰ऍस॰बी॰ऍन॰ 0742525872, 9780742525870.
  96. Perkovich, George. India's nuclear bomb: the impact on global proliferation. University of California Press, 1999. आई॰ऍस॰बी॰ऍन॰ 0520232100, 9780520232105.
  97. Title: India and the United States estranged democracies, 1941–1991, ISBN 1-4289-8189-6, DIANE Publishing
  98. Brzoska, Michael. Women's and Gender History in Global Perspective. Univ of South Carolina Press, 1994. आई॰ऍस॰बी॰ऍन॰ 0872499820, 9780872499829.
  99. Sharma, Ram. India-USSR relations. Discovery Publishing House, 1999. आई॰ऍस॰बी॰ऍन॰ 8171414869, 9788171414864.
  100. Duncan, Peter. The Soviet Union and India. Routledge, 1989. आई॰ऍस॰बी॰ऍन॰ 0415002125, 9780415002127.
  101. Zeev, Maoz. Paradoxes of war: on the art of national self-entrapmen. Routledge, 1990. आई॰ऍस॰बी॰ऍन॰ 0004445113X, 9780044451136.
  102. Declassified telegram sent to the US Department of State
  103. Pakistan And Its Three Wars by Vice Adm (Retd) Iqbal F Quadir – Defence Journal, Pakistan
  104. Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat Richard H. Shultz, Andrea Dew: "The Martial Races Theory had firm adherents in Pakistan and this factor played a major role in the under-estimation of the Indian Army by Pakistani soldiers as well as civilian decision makers in 1965."
  105. An Analysis The Sepoy Rebellion of 1857–59 by AH Amin The army officers of that period were convinced that they were a martial race and the Hindus of Indian Army were cowards. This myth was largely disproved in 1965
  106. Rais, Rasul Bux. The Indian Ocean and the superpowers: economic, political and strategic perspectives. Routledge, 1986. आई॰ऍस॰बी॰ऍन॰ 0709942419, 9780709942412.
  107. Profile of Pakistan – U.S. Department of State, Failure of U.S.'s Pakistan Policy – Interview with Steve Coll
  108. Speech of Bill McCollum in United States House of Representatives September 12, 1994
  109. South Asia in World Politics By Devin T. Hagerty, 2005 Rowman & Littlefield, ISBN 0-7425-2587-2, pp 26
  110. Dr. Ahmad Faruqui
  111. Hassan Abbas (2004). Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror. M.E. Sharpe. आई॰ऍस॰बी॰ऍन॰ 0-7656-1497-9., pp52
  112. BBC
  113. Embassy of Pakistan
  114. Second opinion: The insidious logic of war Khaled Ahmed’s Urdu Press Review Daily Times June 3, 2002
  115. Greg Cashman, Leonard C. Robinson. An introduction to the causes of war: patterns of interstate conflict from World War I to Iraq. Rowman & Littlefield, 2007. आई॰ऍस॰बी॰ऍन॰ 0742555100, 9780742555105.
  116. [Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy By Richard N. Haass, 1998, Council on Foreign Relations, ISBN 0-87609-212-1 pp172
  117. Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age By Peter Paret, 1986, Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19-820097-8 pp802
  118. Rounaq Jahan (1972). Pakistan: Failure in National Integration. Columbia University Press. आई॰ऍस॰बी॰ऍन॰ 0-231-03625-6. Pg 166–167
  119. Reflections on two military presidents By M.P. Bhandara December 25, 2005, Dawn
  120. The Pakistan Army From 1965 to 1971 Yahya Khan as Army Chief-1966-1971 by Maj (Retd) Agha Humayun Amin

Further reading

Sources and external links

साँचा:Military of Pakistan[[ur

कोई टिप्पणी नहीं:

एक टिप्पणी भेजें